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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES LANGDON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880370-CA 
Classification Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
this matter by virtue of 78-2a-3 (2) (e) , Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and 
Committment of the Fifth District Court of Iron County, State of 
Utah, The Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding. The conviction is 
for a second degree felony of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute for value, the substance 
being cocaine. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court improperly deny the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress evidence in the matter where officers 
conducted a warrantless search of the Defendants vehicle? 
Did the officers have sufficient cause to conduct a 
warrantless search of the vehicle under the line of cases 
following Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
77-7-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED. 
AUTHORITY OF A PEACE OFFICER TO STOP AND QUESTION SUSPECT. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and 
Committment ordered from the Bench on June 1, 1988, and signed by 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth District Judge, and filed 
thereafter. The Defendant had entered a plea of no contest 
following a hearing by the Court on a Motion to Suppress Evidence 
heard on May 17, 1988. The Court denied the Motion to Suppress 
Evidence, and thereafter, the Defendant entered his plea of no 
contest. The Defendant is presently serving a term of 
imprisonment in the Utah State Prison of not less than 1 year and 
no more than 15 years. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 17, 1988, the Defendant was arrested and 
charge with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value, the substance being cocaine. On May 17, 
1988, a Motion to Suppress was heard by the District Court and 
was denied. On June 1, 1988, the Defendant entered a plea of no 
contest to the Information and was forthwith sentenced to the 
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Utah State Prison, It is the Judgment, Sentence and Committment 
and the memorandum decision and Order denying the Motion to 
Suppress the Evidence which are the subject for this appeal* 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
After the denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence, the Defendant entered a plea of no contest and was 
thereafter sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a period of not 
less than 1 nor more than 15 years, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Thursday, March 17, 1988, the Defendant was driving 
a 1978 Cadillac from Los Angeles, California, to Omaha, Nebraska, 
along the Interstate 15 freeway in Iron County (Transcript, May 
2, 1988, P. 18), At approximately 6:30 p.m., the Defendant's 
vehicle was observed by Trooper Russell Lee of the Utah Highway 
Patrol to be traveling, apparently with another vehicle, 
northbound on the Interstate freeway at the approximate rate of 
70 miles per hour (T. 30). Trooper Lee stopped the Defendant's 
vehicle but did not stop the other vehicle. Trooper Lee then 
wrote the Defendant a warning citation for speed and checked his 
driver's license and registration (T. 30). Trooper Lee found 
that the Defendant was not the registered owner. The Defendant 
informed Trooper Lee that the vehicle was registered in the name 
of Marvin or Anthony Linnear, one of whom was a stepson (T. 29). 
Langdon informed Trooper Lee that the car was registered in the 
Linnears' names for insurance purposes, and that Langdon had been 
purchasing the car from them for approximately one and one-half 
3 
years (T. 29)• Langdon gave Trooper Lee a telephone number which 
could be called in order to confirm the Defendant's authority to 
be in possession of the car (T. 31) • The Highway Patrol 
dispatcher, at Trooper Lee's request, attempted to call the 
registered owners at the California phone number (T. 18)• While 
the dispatcher was attempting to call the registered owners, 
Trooper Lee asked the Defendant if he could search the car for 
weapons or contraband. The Defendant replied, "I don't care. Go 
ahead (T. 14)". The Trooper searched both the interior and the 
exterior of the car carefully and found welded to the frame of 
the car below the trunk and between the rear bumper and the gas 
tank, a black metal box which appeared to be constructed of 
channel iron measuring approximately 4" x 5" x 12" (T. 2 3 & 33). 
The box was locked with an apparently new padlock (T. 24) . The 
Trooper stated at the Motion to Suppress Hearing that there were 
no signs of dirt or grime or road debris on the box or the lock. 
Trooper Lee was notified by the Highway Patrol dispatcher that 
she had been called by a person purporting to be Anthony Linnear, 
who confirmed that the Defendant had a right to be in possession 
of the vehicle (T. 31) . Both the Defendant and Anthony Linnear 
denied knowledge of the box and refused to give consent for the 
search of the box (T. 38) . The Trooper testified that on the 
basis of the information available to him, he felt the vehicle 
was suspicious (T. 25). Justice of the Peace Margaret Miller was 
contacted and an audio-taped proceeding was had wherein Trooper 
Roger Bagley, who had been at the scene with Trooper Lee, was 
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questioned by Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Keith F. Oehler 
(T. 5). At the conclusion of Trooper Bagley's testimony, Judge 
Miller found that there was sufficient evidence to support a 
search warrant (T. 11) . However, no search warrant was ever 
executed and the vehicle was searched without a warrant (T. 12). 
Approximately seven ounces of cocaine, roughly 90 
percent pure, was recovered from the locked box. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Evidence seized from the Defendant's vehicle was 
seized without a search warrant. 
2. The Defendant and his vehicle were unreasonably 
detained in order to accomplish the seizure of the evidence. 
3. There were insufficient facts available to the 
officer to justify the intrusion into the Defendant's vehicle and 
the locked compartment under the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS 
SEIZED PURSUANT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court determined that the seizure of the 
evidence from the locked compartment underneath the Defendant's 
vehicle was warrantless after having found that the Trooper 
appearing before Justice of the Peace Miller had properly made 
out and Affidavit but that Justice of the Peace Miller had never 
signed a document purporting to be a search warrant (T. 12) . 
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Because the court determined that the search was warrantless, the 
next determination was to find whether or not there was a valid 
search as contemplated in United States v. Leon, 4 68 U.S. 897 
(1984) . The Leon rationale has been adopted with favor by this 
court in the case of State v. Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 
(Utah Ct. App. , March 9, 1988). However, both Leon and State 
v. Thompson can be distinguished from the existing case because 
the officers in both cases had in their possession documents 
supporting the "objectively reasonable reliance on prior, 
external authorization" which are not present in this case. The 
officers in this case acted without any documentation at all and 
therefore it is difficult to see how a claim of reasonable 
reliance on external authorization can be made. 
II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS HELD FOR AN UNREASONABLE PERIOD OF 
TIME PRIOR TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE. 
It should also be argued that the Defendant was seized 
for an unreasonably long period of time. The Defendant was 
originally stopped and issued a traffic warning for speeding. 
The officer testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the 
time need for such a process was 5 to 10 minutes. However, the 
Defendant was stopped for a total of 2 hours and 10 minutes 
before the locked compartment was opened and the evidence 
seized. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), a 90 
minute detention was held to be unreasonably lengthy. A 20 
minute detention was found to be too long in United States 
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v, Gonzales, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985). The United States 
Supreme Court has said in the case of Florida v. Rover, 4 60 
U.S. 491 (1983): 
An investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purposes of the stop. Similarly, the investigative 
methods should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion 
in a short period of time. 
In the present case, the officer's concern about 
whether or not the vehicle was stolen was dispelled by 7:15 p.m. 
The officer had no further legal cause to hold the vehicle after 
that time, and Mr. Langdon should have been released. 
Ill 
THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT FACTS UPON WHICH THE OFFICER 
COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE CONTAINED CONTRABAND, 
AND THEREFORE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The leading case in this field is Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42 (1970) in which police officers were given a 
description of a car involved in a robbery following a second 
armed robbery within a one-week period. The police were also 
given a description of the clothing worn by two of the four men 
seen in the car. Within an hour after receiving the description, 
the police stopped a car meeting the description, carrying four 
men, two of whom were wearing the described clothing. The four 
men were arrested and the vehicle was taken to the police 
station. The police conducted a warrantless search of the car 
and found two revolvers and property stolen in the robberies. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra., recognized 
the long-standing distinction for search and seizure purposes 
between an automobile and a home or office. The court 
acknowledged that there are cases in which circumstances would 
justify the search of an automobile without a warrant which might 
not justify the search of a home or office without a warrant. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chambers and in following 
cases has continually asserted the foundational requirement that 
there must be probable cause to believe that the car contains 
articles that the officers are entitled to seize. 
It is because of the lack of probable cause in this 
case that the evidence should be suppressed. The trooper in this 
case apparently is claiming that the observable fcicts in the 
Defendant's vehicle and the characteristics of the Defendant, 
coupled with the location of the vehicle on the Interstate 15 
freeway, support the concept that the Defendant was meeting some 
sort of drug courier profile. In the case of Reid v. Georgia, 
448 U.S. 438 (1980), the United State Supreme Court held that a 
federal DEA agent, as a matter of law, could not have reasonably 
suspected the Defendant of criminal activity on the basis of 
having arrived in Atlanta from Fort Lauderdale, in the early 
morning, apparently concealing the fact that he was traveling 
with a companion, and carrying no luggage other than a shoulder 
bag. In the instant case, the trooper could not reasonably 
suspect Mr. Langdon of carrying cocaine. There is nothing 
unusual about a vehicle being on Interstate 15, and the fact that 
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the vehicle has a new paint job and new expensive tires does not 
support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. One day's 
worth of fast food wrappers in the car only supports the 
reasonable inference that Mr. Langdon had been driving from 
California and eating his meals along the road at drive-in 
restaurants. The trooper had direct information from a person 
purporting to be the owner of the car that Mr. Langdon had 
permission to have the car. The claim that there were few 
personal items in the car is specious when two pieces of luggage 
were found in the trunk, and a pillow and blanket or sleeping 
bag were located in the back seat. In this circumstance where 
the Defendant was unreasonably detained for 2 hours and 10 
minutes while the State attempted to get a search warrant which 
was never issued, there is not the type of probable cause present 
to even support such a search warrant. It is not unreasonable to 
believe that on any given day dozens of vehicles travel on 
Interstate 15 in Iron County which have locked compartments and 
all of the other characteristics which were present in 
Mr. Langdon's vehicle. The writer of this Brief is familiar with 
several family vehicles which travel on Interstate 15 and other 
highways within the State of Utah which have specially welded 
locked compartments affixed to the vehicle. The fact that these 
compartments contain fishing poles rather than contraband is 
known to this writer, but the appearance of the locked 
compartments on the vehicle is not sufficient justification for a 
warrantless search of the vehicle and a 2 hour detention of the 
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driver. None of the factors supporting probable cause for a 
warrantless search as outlined in Chambers v. Maroneyr Supra., or 
in a later case of Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), are 
present in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
As the officers searched this vehicle without a valid 
search warrant, and because of the lack of other factors 
supporting probable cause for a warrantless search, cind the lack 
of good faith exceptions in this case, the evidence in this case 
should be suppressed and the Defendant should be allowed to 
withdraw his no contest plea and be discharged. 
DATED this y day of September, 1988. 
p^££/L. SHUMftTE v 
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